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Sick of Your Colleagues’ Absence?
*
 
We utilize a large-scale randomized social experiment to identify how coworkers affect each 
other’s effort as measured by work absence. The experiment altered the work absence 
incentives for half of all employees living in Göteborg, Sweden. Using administrative data we 
are able to recover the treatment status of all workers in more than 3,000 workplaces. We 
first document that employees in workplaces with a high proportion treated coworkers 
increase their own absence level significantly. We then examine the heterogeneity of the 
treatment effect in order to explore what mechanisms are underlying the peer effect. While a 
strong effect of having a high proportion of treated coworkers is found for the nontreated 
workers, no significant effects are found for the treated workers. These results suggest that 
pure altruistic social preferences can be ruled out as the main motivator for the behaviour of 
a nonnegligible proportion of the employees in our sample. 
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A substantial amount of theoretical work has suggested that social interac-
tions within the workplace are an important determinant of worker eﬀort
and ﬁrm productivity.1 Recently a growing empirical literature, using
matched employer-employee data, has aimed at identifying to what extent
social preferences aﬀect productivity in practice. Due to the lack of con-
sistent and reliable measures of eﬀort/productivity across ﬁrms, previous
studies have been forced to examine social interactions between coworkers’
eﬀort using data from single ﬁrms or occupations.2 While using high qual-
ity data from single ﬁrms sometimes enhances the ability to tease out what
type of mechanisms are underlying the social interaction eﬀect, clearly, the
evidence provided by case studies might be diﬃcult to generalize to other
populations.
Therefore, in order to shed further light on how coworkers aﬀect each
other’s behaviour we take an alternative approach compared to previous
studies. We focus on how coworkers aﬀect each other’s eﬀort in the form
of work absence. Work absence is, of course, intimately related to the pro-
ductivity of the ﬁrm. This relationship is perhaps most obvious in ﬁrms
with justintime type of production technologies. In such ﬁrms the output
loss associated with the unexpected absence of one worker is not simply
equal to the loss of the single worker’s output, but potentially also the lost
total value of the entire downstream production line. Moreover, in many
jobs both management and co-workers may experience diﬃculties in ob-
serving whether an employee shirks or not. The pattern and frequency of
work absence is however arguably more easily monitored and may serve as
a proxy for the worker’s eﬀort. The relative ease of monitoring co-workers’
absence suggests that studying this type of behaviour should be rewarding
when trying to investigate whether and through which underlying mech-
anisms co-workers aﬀect each other’s eﬀort.
To address many of the severe identiﬁcation problems associated with
the estimation of social interaction eﬀects we make use of the exogenous
variation in work absence incentive induced by a large-scale randomized
1For example Lazear (1989), Kandel and Lazear (1992), and Rotemberg (1994) in-
corporate social concerns into the analysis of behavior within ﬁrms.
2For example in four recent, interesting and related studies Bandiera, Barankay and
Rasul (2005); Mas and Moretti (forthcoming); Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2007);
Kato and Shu (2008) use data from a fruit picking farm in the UK, 6 US supermarket
stores, male professional golfers on the PGA tour, and a Chinese textile ﬁrm respectively.
2 Sick of your colleagues’ absence?experiment.3 During the experiment, formal monitoring during absence
was relaxed for half of all employees in the city of Göteborg, Sweden.
Instead of having to provide a physicians certiﬁcate on the eighth day
of an absence spell, the treated individuals did not need to provide a
certiﬁcate until the 15th day of the spell. Treatment assignment was
based on date of birth (even/uneven) and applied to all employees living in
Göteborg municipality (pop.∼500,000). As treatment was determined at
the individual level, the number of treated workers within each workplace
varied substantially. Using a rich administrative data set we are able
to recover the treatment status of all workers, and hence the proportion
treated, within each one of the around 3,000 workplaces in operation in
Göteborg during the experiment.
We start oﬀ by showing that the experiment strongly aﬀected the short
term absence level among the treated workers in our sample.4 We then
focus on whether social preferences aﬀect short-term absence. Our idea
for testing for the prevalence of social preferences among the employees is
straightforward. We ﬁrst show that conditional on treatment status the
proportion of treated within each workplace is strongly correlated with the
change in individual worker’s absence. This result suggests that coworkers
indeed have an important inﬂuence on employees’ behaviour.
We then examine the heterogeneity of the treatment eﬀect to explore
what types of social preferences are most likely underlying the social inter-
action eﬀect. Interestingly, we ﬁnd stark diﬀerences in the eﬀect of having
many treated co-workers depending on the worker’s own treatment status.
While the proportion treated at the workplace is a good predictor for the
change in absence level among the non-treated, no signiﬁcant eﬀects can
be found among the treated. The heterogeneous spill-over eﬀects suggest
that the observed co-worker eﬀect is not driven by preferences for joint
leisure. Neither does it seem in line with a hypothesis suggesting that
information sharing among co-workers is causing the observed peer eﬀect.
Given the randomized treatment assignment, if either of these two mech-
anisms would be responsible for the estimated peer eﬀect we would expect
that also the treated employees absence level should be correlated with the
share of treated at the workplace. The heterogeneous response by treated
3See e.g Manski (1993, 1995) for a description of the diﬃculties in estimation of
social interaction eﬀects.
4Hesselius, Johansson and Larsson (2005) ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant and large
eﬀect on average duration of absence due to the experiment.
Sick of your colleagues’ absence? 3and non-treated workers instead suggest that a non-negligible proportion
of the workers have reciprocal type of preferences and/or display fairness
concerns.5
The prevalence of social preference has previously been documented in
several laboratory experiments. The evidence of such preferences outside
of the laboratory is however more scarce. Our study complement and ex-
tend the evidence on the prevalence of social preferences in the workplace
found by Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2006), Mas and Moretti (forth-
coming), and Ichino and Maggi (2000). These studies all use observational
data from single ﬁrms. Our main contribution to the literature on social
preferences and worker eﬀort is to provide evidence on the prevalence of
similar social mechanisms at work using a randomized social experiment
and linked employer-employee data from around 3,000 workplaces. These
two features signiﬁcantly improve both the internal as well as the external
validity of the results found.
The paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy describe the
general context of our study, providing details on the Swedish sickness
insurance system and the experiment. In Section 3 the data and empir-
ical strategy is presented. Section 4 contains the results and Section 5
concludes.
2 Institutional Background and the Experiment
2.1 Temporary Work Absence in Sweden
In Sweden sickness insurance is compulsory and universal to all employees,
students and unemployed. It is ﬁnanced by a proportional pay-roll tax and
replaces individuals earnings lost due to temporary health problems. The
beneﬁt level received is related to the loss of earnings during the absence
spell.
In an international context the sickness beneﬁt levels are, and have
been, generous. For most workers the beneﬁt level was set to 90% of
previous earnings. Some workers at the very top of the wage distribution
were however excluded from receiving the full 90% due to a beneﬁt cap.
Besides the public insurance, most Swedish workers are also covered by
extra sickness insurance regulated in agreements between the unions and
5See e.g. Rabin (1993), Fehr and Gächter (2000) for references and discussions on
the importance of such preferences in the labor market.
4 Sick of your colleagues’ absence?the employers’ confederations. These top-up insurances generally cover
about 10% of the lost earnings but there is considerable variation. Hence
the total compensation in case of work absence due to illness could be
fully 100%.6
The public insurance has no limit for how long and how often sick-
ness beneﬁts are paid. Many spells stretch over a full year and there are
examples of even longer durations. The individual have a high degree of
discretion when to report sick. The beneﬁt payments are generous, and
the monitoring before the eighth absence day is lax. A sickness absence
spell starts when the worker calls the public insurance oﬃce (and her em-
ployer), then within a week (on the eighth day) he/she should conﬁrm
her eligibility with the insurance oﬃce by presenting a medical certiﬁcate
proving reduced work capacity due to illness. The public insurance oﬃce
reviews the certiﬁcate and then declines or approves further sick-leave. In
all but very few cases the certiﬁcate is approved. In case the insurance
oﬃce suspects abuse they can make unannounced visits to the claimant’s
home.
2.2 The Experiment
In the fall of 1988 the regional social insurance board in the municipality
of Göteborg, the second largest city in Sweden, and in Jämtland, a large
and relatively sparsely populated region in the north of Sweden, agreed on
performing a social experiment regarding the timing of the requirement
for a physician’s certiﬁcate. A randomly assigned treatment group was
allowed to be absent from work due to illness for 14 days before they
needed a physician’s certiﬁcate in order to continue their absence spell with
insurance compensation. The control group faced the ordinary restriction
of seven days. Individuals were assigned to the treatment and control
group based on their date of birth. Those born on even days ended up
in the treatment group, and those born on uneven days in the control
group. Hence, due to the universal insurance coverage, everyone who was
of working age and lived in the experiment regions was assigned to either
the control or the treatment group.7
6See e.g. Johansson and Palme (1996, 2002, and 2005), Henreksson and Persson
(2004) for studies on eﬀects of diﬀerent compensation schemes on individual work ab-
sence.
7Government employees were exempted, as they, by law, receive their sick leave
compensation from the employer instead of from the social security oﬃce. The em-
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ment. All were based on a notion that extending the time-period without
monitoring would decrease costs and reduce sickness absence. The main
argument was that with the 15-day restriction unnecessary visits to a
physician could be avoided, which would cut costs for both the individual
and the public health care system. The insurance agency also believed
that physicians by routine prescribed longer absence from work than ne-
cessary. With an extended certiﬁcate-free period of two weeks many in-
dividuals would have time to return to work before a medical certiﬁcate
was needed, and thus individual and public costs would be reduced.
The experiment started on 1 July 1988 and besides the personnel at
the social insurance oﬃce, all employers and medical centres were informed
before or during the experiment. A massive information campaign also
preceded the experiment at the two locations, including mass-media cov-
erage, distribution of pamphlets and posters at workplaces, etc. Short
information about the experiment was also written on the form that every
insured reporting sick needed to ﬁll in and send to the insurance oﬃce to
receive sickness beneﬁts. The experiment ended on 1 January 1989, at
which point the previous system was resurrected.
Hesselius, Johansson and Larsson (2005) show that absence spell dur-
ations increased substantially among the treated group compared to the
control group. The characteristic spike in exit rates from absence, which
before the experiment typically occurred on day 7, was during the exper-
iment postponed and instead occurred on day 14 of the spell (i.e. just
before the need for a physicians certiﬁcate). They also report heterogen-
eous treatment eﬀects between women and men. Men prolonged their
work absence spells more than women.
The estimates provided by Hesselius et al. did however not control for
potential spill-over eﬀects between the treated and the controls. Whether
doing so yields an upward or downward biased estimate of the true treat-
ment eﬀect is a prior uncertain. The direction of the bias will depend on if
individuals care about e.g. co-workers’ behaviour and if so why they care.
In the following section we provide evidence on the eﬀects of co-workers
behaviour on individual absence decision and the reason why.
ployer, in turn, receives the beneﬁt from the social security oﬃce. We hence exclude all
Governmental workplaces.









Figure 1: Distribution of treated workers at workplaces in Göteborg
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
We use data from a set of administrative registers compiled by Statist-
ics Sweden. The data contains, besides a set of individual background
characteristics, data on start and end date of all absence spells during
1988. We also observe the workplaces where the individual is gainfully
employed in November 1988. A few individuals have multiple workplaces,
but for simplicity we assume that the workplace from which the highest
yearly earning is received is also the main arena for co-worker interac-
tion. The treatment status of each worker was decided by date of birth
(even/uneven) and whether the individual is residing in Göteborg muni-
cipality or not. Figure 1 show the distribution of treated workers at the
workplaces in Göteborg municipality.
As seen in Figure 1 the between workplace variance in proportion of
treated is considerable. The average workplace has around 35% of treated
workers. The variation in proportion treated workers stem from the ran-
dom assignment of treatment, but also from the number of commuting
co-workers. In the main analysis we focus on workplaces with between
10 and 100 employees as social interactions is probably most prevalent in
Sick of your colleagues’ absence? 7small to medium sized workplaces. The workplaces with 10 employees and
less are excluded from the sample as alternative rules may apply to these
workplaces.
The large variation in proportion treated workers across workplaces
provides us with a close to ideal setting to identify the eﬀects of co-worker
interactions. Our idea to identify the prevalence of co-worker interactions
is straightforward. Given the random assignment of treatment status,
if the proportion treated within each workplace aﬀects individual work
absence decisions we can be certain that co-workers indeed aﬀect each
other’s behavior. The baseline model we estimate by OLS is speciﬁed in
equation (1)
∆sij = α0 + β0treatedi + β1πj + εij (1)
where ∆sij is the change in number of days of short term absence (shorter
than 15 days) between ﬁrst and second half of 1988 of employee i at work-
place j.8 Treated takes the value 1 if the employee resides in Göteborg and
is born on an even date, and 0 otherwise. πj is the proportion of treated
co-workers at employee i’s workplace (excluding employee i). Given the
ﬁrst diﬀerencing and the random assignment of treatment, a signiﬁcant
estimate of β1 identiﬁes spill-over eﬀects among the employees.9 Inference
is based on robust standard errors allowing for clustering at the workplace
level.
8The empirical analysis focuses on the change in work absence to control for the
possibility that workplaces with diﬀerent shares of commuters also are systematically
diﬀerent in some unobserved way. The ﬁrst diﬀerencing approach controls for time-
invariant unobserved individual and workplace heterogeneity.
9Note that if we only used the directly non-treated individuals when estimating
equation (1) could this speciﬁcation be seen as a reduced form in the estimation of
endogenous eﬀects. This second stage structural equation would, among others, require
rational expectations of the individuals, that is; the correct prediction of the coworkers
response from the more lenient monitoring. Equation (1) does not require that the
observed reaction to the fraction of treated is due to an actual increase in absence
among treated coworkers. Hence, (non-rational) expectation of an increase in shirking
among treated co-workers during the experiment may have an eﬀect on behavior.
8 Sick of your colleagues’ absence?Table 1: Direct and indirect eﬀects of experiment
Speciﬁcation 1 2 3
Sample: All All All: pre- experiment
Treated .886*** .889*** .061
(.057) (.058) .(.050)
Proportion treated .554** -.134
(.210) (0.193)
R-squared 0.0035 0.0036 0.000
# observations 79,643 79,643 77,647
Note: Dependent variable is the change in number of days in
short term absence (spells shorter than 15 days). */**/***
denoted statistical signiﬁcance at 10/5/1 percent level,
respectively. The number of co-workers, gender, age and annual
earnings is included as control variables. Standard errors are
reported in parenthesis and are cluster adjusted at the workplace
level. Number of workplaces is 3,008 for the experiment period
and 2,910 for the pre-experiment period (1987).
4 Results
4.1 Main Results
In column (1) of Table 1 we start by presenting the “naïve” estimate of the
direct treatment eﬀect,β0, from a speciﬁcation using only the treatment
status as explanatory variable. The estimated eﬀect suggests that being
assigned to treatment increases the short-term work absence with 0.88
days on average. In column (2) of Table 1 both estimates of β0 and β1
from equation (1) is reported. The share of treated co-workers indeed
increases the short-term absence level substantially.
The ﬁnding that the share of treated co-workers within a workplace
aﬀects individual worker’s absence decisions provides clear evidence on
the importance of peer eﬀects in the workplace. The indirect eﬀect is
furthermore sizable in relationship to the direct eﬀect of being treated.
An increase in the proportion of treated colleagues from 0 to 1 increases
the change in absence by 0.55 days in average. Both the direct and the
indirect treatment eﬀects are furthermore substantial given that during
the ﬁrst half of 1988 the average number of short-term absence days was
2.32 in our sample.
We have also performed a number of speciﬁcation checks in order to
Sick of your colleagues’ absence? 9assess the robustness of the results. First we re-ran the same analysis
using data from the ﬁrst and second half of 1987, i.e. the year prior to the
experiment. The result from this exercise is presented in column (3) of
Table 1. The eﬀects of the share of treated and individual treatment are
both statistically insigniﬁcant and in the case of share of treated co-workers
the sign is changed. This is in sharp contrast with the eﬀect on absence
during the experiment. That is, in the year prior to the experiment the
share of employees being born on an even date had no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on absence, but a large positive eﬀect during the experiment. This result
strengthens our conﬁdence in the validity of the estimation strategy.
We have also re-estimated the same models for diﬀerent workplace sizes
and also used the change in total number of absence days as well as the
change in number of absence days in spells shorter than eighth days as the
dependent variable.10 These changes in speciﬁcation yielded qualitatively
similar results. In the smallest workplaces (10-20 employees) considered
the estimated spill-over eﬀect is largest and then decreases monotonic-
ally as we stepwise enter larger workplaces. We have also checked for
nonlinearities by adding a quadratic term in the share of treated to the
speciﬁcation. These estimates suggested that there is a tendency towards
a concave relationship (signiﬁcant at 10% level) between work absence and
the share of treated co-workers (maximum when 42% of the co-workers are
treated). Using the natural log of the share of treated instead of the share
of treated yielded similar results.11 Finally, we also estimated separate
models for males and females. The separately estimated models produce
slightly higher and more precise estimates for males than for females.
4.2 What mechanisms are underlying the spill-over eﬀect?
Many studies have found that social interactions matter for individual
behavior in various settings. Very few studies have however with any cer-
tainty been able to tell what type of mechanisms is underlying the eﬀect of
peers.12 This is naturally a much more diﬃcult question to answer empir-
ically. We believe that the spill-over eﬀects found in this setting can be ex-
10These results are retained due to space limitations but are available upon request
from the authors.
11In this speciﬁcation the fraction of treated was multiplied by 100 and those without
any treated were then assigned as having 1% treated before taking the logs.
12Two notable exceptions are Mas and Moretti (forthcoming) and Bandiera, Barankay
and Rasul (2005).
10 Sick of your colleagues’ absence?plained in three ways: 1.) Joint leisure: co-workers may form tight bonds
and hence enjoy leisure time together. A higher absence level as a result
of a higher proportion treated co-workers could therefore be explained by
preferences for joint leisure time. 2.) Information sharing: Prior to the
experiment, information about the absence leave system may have been
incomplete. A higher proportion of treated workers may therefore be cor-
related with average absence level at the workplace simply because more
workers now become aware of how the system works. However, given the
large information campaign about the setup of the experiment in action
prior to and during the experiment, the importance of co-workers as an
information channel is probably reduced in this context. We therefore do
not expect information sharing between co-workers to have a large eﬀect
on work absence. 3.) Reciprocity/Fairness: Observing a sudden increased
absence level among treated co-workers may induce resentment and lead
to ill feelings towards the shirking co-workers. For example, if the work-
load of the absent worker is shifted to the remaining workers, the absence
of a co-worker is costly as the remaining workers may need to increase
their eﬀort. If shirking co-workers induces such costs, formal or informal
social sanctions of this behaviour might be warranted. While there is a
number of imaginable ways through which punishment may take place, a
natural retaliation could be to increase one’s own absence level for fairness
reasons.
The two ﬁrst hypotheses are more in line with altruistic type of social
preferences while the third is more in line with non-altruistic social pref-
erences. Moreover, while the ﬁrst two hypotheses arguably predict sim-
ilar (or smaller) eﬀects on non-treated and treated, the third hypothesis
suggest that non-treated should respond more strongly to an increasing
proportion of treated co-workers.13
The results presented in Table 2 helps us distinguish which one of the
suggested explanations is most likely driving the observed spill-over eﬀect.
Column (1) and (2) reports the estimate of β1 from equation (1) for the
treated and non-treated employees separately. Interestingly, the share of
13An additional channel through which an increase in work absence among co-workers
might aﬀect individual work absence is through direct negative eﬀects on health; from
e.g. the stress of facing an increased workload. Although we cannot completely rule it
out, we believe that the short duration of the experiment and our focus on short-term
absence most likely diminishes the risk of such eﬀects to have any major inﬂuence on
the estimates. Also, note that such a mechanism would probably yield a similar eﬀect
on both treated and non-treated.
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Speciﬁcation 1 2 3 4
Dependent variable #(<8 days) #(<8 days) #(<15 days) #(<15 days)
Sample: Treated Non-treated Treated Non-treated
Proportion treated -.023 .365*** .270 .600***
(.249) (.141) (.457) (.223)
# Observations 23,803 55,840 23,803 55,840
Note: Dependent variable is the change in number of days in short-term
absence less than 8 and 15 days in columns (1),(2) and (3),(4) respectively.
The number of co-workers, gender, age and annual earnings is also included
as a control variables.*/**/*** denotes statistical signiﬁcance at 10/5/1 percent
level respectively. Standard errors presented in parenthesis are clustered at the
workplace level. Number of workplaces is 3008.
treated has a negligible and insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the treated workers’
absence decisions. On the contrary, for the non-treated workers we ﬁnd a
large and signiﬁcant eﬀect of having many treated co-workers. Columns
(3) and (4) display that the same pattern hold when instead the change
in number of days in spells shorter than 15 days is used as the dependent
variable.
The results in Table 2 clearly point towards the reciprocity hypothesis
and away from the other two hypotheses suggested; joint leisure and in-
formation sharing. If joint leisure was the main motivator behind the
response to the share of treated within the workplace, due to the random
assignment of treatment, we would expect that not only the non-treated
reacted but also the treated co-workers. As seen above this is not the case.
The same argument holds for the information sharing hypothesis. Inform-
ation sharing should increase absence not only for the non-treated but
arguably also the treated. The large information campaign implemented
prior to and during the experiment as discussed above probably reduced
the importance of treated peers as an information channel. The relatively
weak eﬀects among treated and strong eﬀect among non-treated therefore
more likely reﬂect reciprocal type of social preferences or fairness concerns
among the workers in our setting.
However, as pointed out by e.g. Sobel (1993), it should be noted that
due to the possibility of repeated interactions it is notoriously diﬃcult
to distinguish between reciprocal social preferences and pure self-interest
12 Sick of your colleagues’ absence?outside of the laboratory. At the very least, as for Mas and Moretti (forth-
coming) and Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005), our results suggest
that pure altruistic social preferences can be ruled out as an explanation
for the interaction eﬀect in behaviour among co- workers.
5 Concluding Remarks
We provide preliminary evidence suggesting that social interactions are
an important determinant of worker eﬀort as measured by work absence
by using data from a social experiment aﬀecting work absence incentives
of 70,000 employees in 3,000 workplaces. As previous evidence on the
prevalence of social preferences comes from laboratory experiments or from
studies using observational data from single ﬁrms, our study constitutes
a signiﬁcant contribution to the current literature on spill-over eﬀects at
work.
It should be noted that the reduced form analysis we employ here
prohibits us from drawing deﬁnite conclusions about the exact nature of
the underlying causes of the observed social interaction eﬀects. In future
work we plan to apply a more structural approach, and also use data
on the exact timing of the absence spells for treated and non-treated in
order to get a better understanding of the nature of the underlying social
preferences.
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